Corruption Dynamics: The Golden Goose Effect | Zendy

Paul Niehaus | Zendy; Sandip Sukhtankar | Zendy

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Corruption Dynamics: The Golden Goose Effect

Author(s) -

Paul Niehaus,

Sandip Sukhtankar

Publication year - 2013

Publication title -

american economic journal economic policy

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 7.868

H-Index - 62

eISSN - 1945-7731

pISSN - 1945-774X

DOI - 10.1257/pol.5.4.230

Subject(s) - economic rent , goose , language change , context (archaeology) , economics , statutory law , wage , rent seeking , labour economics , microeconomics , law , politics , political science , geography , biology , art , paleontology , literature , archaeology

Theoretical work on disciplining corrupt agents has emphasized the role of expected future rents?for example, efficiency wages. Yet taken seriously this approach implies that illicit future rents should also deter corruption. We study this "golden goose" effect in the context of a statutory wage increase in India's employment guarantee scheme, comparing official microrecords to original household survey data to measure corruption. We estimate large golden goose effects that reduced the total impact of the wage increase on theft by roughly 64 percent. In short, rent expectations matter

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