Open AccessFast-Track Authority and International Trade Negotiations
Author(s) -
Paola Conconi,
Giovanni Facchini,
Maurizio Zanardi
Publication year - 2012
Publication title -
american economic journal economic policy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 7.868
H-Index - 62
eISSN - 1945-7731
pISSN - 1945-774X
DOI - 10.1257/pol.4.3.146
Subject(s) - negotiation , delegation , track (disk drive) , international trade , free trade agreement , power (physics) , key (lock) , economics , political science , law and economics , business , international economics , public administration , industrial organization , free trade , law , computer science , computer security , physics , quantum mechanics , operating system
We develop a simple model of trade relations in which legislators with different stakes in import-competing and export industries decide whether to grant fast-track authority (FTA) to the president, giving up the power to amend international trade agreements. We show that strategic delegation motives are key to understanding FTA votes, which involve a decision between alternative country representatives: the executive or the majority in Congress. We then examine the determinants of all votes by US congressmen on FTA since the introduction of this institutional procedure in 1974. Our empirical analysis provides strong support for the predictions of the model
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