Taxing Hidden Wealth: The Consequences of US Enforcement Initiatives on Evasive Foreign Accounts
Author(s) -
Niels Johannesen,
Patrick Langetieg,
Daniel Reck,
Max Risch,
Joel Slemrod
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
american economic journal economic policy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 7.868
H-Index - 62
eISSN - 1945-7731
pISSN - 1945-774X
DOI - 10.1257/pol.20180410
Subject(s) - enforcement , microdata (statistics) , business , revenue , capital (architecture) , tax revenue , capital income , public economics , economics , finance , tax reform , international taxation , geography , political science , population , demography , archaeology , sociology , law , census
In 2008, the IRS initiated efforts to curb the use of offshore accounts to evade taxes. This paper uses administrative microdata to examine the impact of enforcement efforts on taxpayers' reporting of offshore accounts and income. We find that enforcement caused approximately 50,000 individuals to disclose offshore accounts with a combined value of about $100 billion. Most disclosures happened outside offshore voluntary disclosure programs by individuals who never admitted prior noncompliance. Disclosed accounts were concentrated in countries often characterized as tax havens. Enforcement-driven disclosures increased annual reported capital income by $2–$4 billion, corresponding to $0.6–$1.2 billion in additional tax revenue.
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