Criminal Deterrence when There Are Offsetting Risks: Traffic Cameras, Vehicular Accidents, and Public Safety | Zendy

Justin Gallagher | Zendy; Paul J. Gallagher Fisher | Zendy

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Criminal Deterrence when There Are Offsetting Risks: Traffic Cameras, Vehicular Accidents, and Public Safety

Author(s) -

Justin Gallagher,

Paul J. Gallagher Fisher

Publication year - 2020

Publication title -

american economic journal economic policy

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 7.868

H-Index - 62

eISSN - 1945-7731

pISSN - 1945-774X

DOI - 10.1257/pol.20170674

Subject(s) - deterrence theory , computer security , deterrence (psychology) , traffic accident , referendum , geocoding , business , transport engineering , computer science , engineering , political science , geography , remote sensing , politics , law

Numerous cities have enacted electronic monitoring programs at traffic intersections in an effort to reduce the high number of vehicle accidents. The rationale is that the higher expected fines for running a red light will induce drivers to stop and lead to fewer cross-road collisions. However, the cameras also incentivize drivers to accept a greater accident risk from stopping. We evaluate the termination of a monitoring program via a voter referendum using 12 years of geocoded police accident data. We find that the cameras changed the composition of accidents but no evidence of a reduction in total accidents or injuries. (JEL D72, K42, R41)

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