Mafia in the Ballot Box | Zendy

Giuseppe De Feo | Zendy; Giacomo Davide De Luca | Zendy

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Mafia in the Ballot Box

Author(s) -

Giuseppe De Feo,

Giacomo Davide De Luca

Publication year - 2017

Publication title -

american economic journal economic policy

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 7.868

H-Index - 62

eISSN - 1945-7731

pISSN - 1945-774X

DOI - 10.1257/pol.20150551

Subject(s) - ballot , democracy , political science , competition (biology) , sicilian , communism , organised crime , political economy , law , public administration , economics , politics , voting , ecology , linguistics , philosophy , biology

In a theoretical model of political competition we analyze the role played by a criminal organization that can sell the votes it controls to the highest bidder. We show that (i) the incumbent party is willing to pay the highest price to secure mafia services; (ii) the volume of electoral trade with the mafia increases with political competition. Guided by these theoretical predictions, we study in detail the parliamentary elections in Sicily for the period 1946-92. We document the significant support given by the Sicilian mafia to the Christian Democratic Party when the electoral competition by the Communist party strengthened. We also provide suggestive evidence that, in exchange for its electoral support, the mafia obtained economic advantages in the construction sector.

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