Deduction Dilemmas: The Taiwan Assignment Mechanism | Zendy

Umut Dur | Zendy; Parag A. Pathak | Zendy; Fei Song | Zendy; Tayfun Sönmez | Zendy

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Deduction Dilemmas: The Taiwan Assignment Mechanism

Author(s) -

Umut Dur,

Parag A. Pathak,

Fei Song,

Tayfun Sönmez

Publication year - 2022

Publication title -

american economic journal microeconomics

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 5.339

H-Index - 40

eISSN - 1945-7685

pISSN - 1945-7669

DOI - 10.1257/mic.20180386

Subject(s) - mechanism (biology) , business , operations research , engineering , epistemology , philosophy

This paper analyzes the Taiwan mechanism used nationwide for high school assignment starting in 2014. In the Taiwan mechanism, points are deducted from an applicant’s score, with larger penalties for lower-ranked choices. Deduction makes the mechanism a hybrid of the Boston and deferred acceptance mechanisms. Our analysis sheds light on why Taiwan’s new mechanism has led to massive nationwide demonstrations and why it nonetheless remains in use. (JEL D47, I21, I28)

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