Spillover Effects of Institutions on Cooperative Behavior, Preferences, and Beliefs | Zendy

Florian Engl | Zendy; Arno Riedl | Zendy; Roberto A. Weber | Zendy

AI Assistant Blog Pricing

Home ZAIA Blog

Open Access

Spillover Effects of Institutions on Cooperative Behavior, Preferences, and Beliefs

Author(s) -

Florian Engl,

Arno Riedl,

Roberto A. Weber

Publication year - 2021

Publication title -

american economic journal microeconomics

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 5.339

H-Index - 40

eISSN - 1945-7685

pISSN - 1945-7669

DOI - 10.1257/mic.20180336

Subject(s) - spillover effect , cooperativeness , enforcement , scope (computer science) , affect (linguistics) , economics , microeconomics , public good , control (management) , public economics , punishment (psychology) , social psychology , psychology , political science , programming language , management , communication , personality , law , computer science , temperament

Most institutions are limited in scope. We study experimentally how enforcement institutions affect behavior, preferences, and beliefs beyond their direct influence over the behaviors they control. Groups play two identical public good games, with cooperation institutionally enforced in one game. Institutions generally have economically significant positive spillover effects to the unregulated game. We also observe that institutions enhance conditional cooperation preferences and beliefs about others’ cooperativeness, suggesting that both factors are drivers of observed spillover effects. In additional treatments, we provide evidence for several factors, including characteristics of institutions, that enhance or limit the effectiveness and scope of spillover effects. (JEL C92, D02, D83, D91, H41)

The content you want is available to Zendy users.

Already have an account? Click here to sign in.

Having issues? You can contact us here

Accelerating Research