Designing Dynamic Research Contests | Zendy

JeanMichel Benkert | Zendy; Igor Letina | Zendy

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Designing Dynamic Research Contests

Author(s) -

JeanMichel Benkert,

Igor Letina

Publication year - 2020

Publication title -

american economic journal microeconomics

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 5.339

H-Index - 40

eISSN - 1945-7685

pISSN - 1945-7669

DOI - 10.1257/mic.20180263

Subject(s) - contest , interim , principal (computer security) , economics , period (music) , microeconomics , computer science , political science , computer security , law , philosophy , aesthetics

This paper studies the optimal design of dynamic research contests. We introduce interim transfers, which are paid in every period while the contest is ongoing, to an otherwise standard setting. We show that a contest where (i) the principal can stop the contest in any period, (ii) a constant interim transfer is paid to agents in each period while the contest is ongoing, and (iii) a final prize is paid once the principal stops the contest, is optimal for the principal and implements the first-best. (JEL D82, O32)

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