Is No News (Perceived As) Bad News? An Experimental Investigation of Information Disclosure | Zendy

Ginger Zhe Jin | Zendy; Michael Luca | Zendy; Daniel Martin | Zendy

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Is No News (Perceived As) Bad News? An Experimental Investigation of Information Disclosure

Author(s) -

Ginger Zhe Jin,

Michael Luca,

Daniel Martin

Publication year - 2021

Publication title -

american economic journal microeconomics

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 5.339

H-Index - 40

eISSN - 1945-7685

pISSN - 1945-7669

DOI - 10.1257/mic.20180217

Subject(s) - communication source , private information retrieval , skepticism , cheap talk , test (biology) , deception , economics , microeconomics , public information , psychology , social psychology , internet privacy , computer science , computer security , telecommunications , paleontology , philosophy , epistemology , biology

This paper uses laboratory experiments to directly test a central prediction of disclosure theory: that strategic forces can lead those who possess private information to voluntarily provide it. In a simple sender-receiver game, we find that senders disclose favorable information, but withhold unfavorable information. The degree to which senders withhold information is strongly related to their stated beliefs about receiver actions, and their stated beliefs are accurate on average. Receiver actions are also strongly related to their stated beliefs, but their actions and beliefs suggest that many are insufficiently skeptical about nondisclosed information in the absence of repeated feedback. (JEL C70, D82, D83)

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