Zone Pricing in Retail Oligopoly
Author(s) -
Brian M. Adams,
Kevin Williams
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
american economic journal microeconomics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 5.339
H-Index - 40
eISSN - 1945-7685
pISSN - 1945-7669
DOI - 10.1257/mic.20170130
Subject(s) - oligopoly , competition (biology) , market power , economic surplus , predatory pricing , economics , microeconomics , price discrimination , business , consumer welfare , variable pricing , pricing strategies , welfare , industrial organization , cournot competition , market economy , monopoly , ecology , biology
We quantify the welfare effects of zone pricing, or setting common prices across distinct markets, in retail oligopoly. Although monopolists can only increase profits by price discriminating, this need not be true when firms face competition. With novel data covering the retail home improvement industry, we find that Home Depot would benefit from finer pricing but that Lowe’s would prefer coarser pricing. The use of zone pricing softens competition in markets where firms compete, but it shields consumers from higher prices in markets where firms might otherwise exercise market power. Overall, zone pricing produces higher consumer surplus than finer pricing discrimination does.
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