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Incomplete Disclosure: Evidence of Signaling and Countersignaling
Author(s) -
Benjamin B. Bederson,
Ginger Zhe Jin,
Phillip Leslie,
Alexander J. Quinn,
Ben Zou
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
american economic journal microeconomics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 5.339
H-Index - 40
eISSN - 1945-7685
pISSN - 1945-7669
DOI - 10.1257/mic.20150178
Subject(s) - quality (philosophy) , voluntary disclosure , business , advertising , psychology , accounting , epistemology , philosophy
In 2011, Maricopa County adopted voluntary restaurant hygiene grade cards (A, B, C, D). Using inspection results between 2007 and 2013, we show that only 58 percent of the subsequent inspections led to online grade posting. Although the disclosure rate in general declines with inspection outcome, higher-quality A restaurants are less likely to disclose than lower-quality As. After examining potential explanations, we believe the observed pattern is best explained by a mixture of signaling and countersignaling: the better A restaurants use nondisclosure as a countersignal, while worse As and better Bs use disclosure to stand out from the other restaurants.

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