Falling Dominoes: A Theory of Rare Events and Crisis Contagion
Author(s) -
Heng Chen,
Wing Suen
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
american economic journal microeconomics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 5.339
H-Index - 40
eISSN - 1945-7685
pISSN - 1945-7669
DOI - 10.1257/mic.20140147
Subject(s) - complementarity (molecular biology) , currency , global game , economics , falling (accident) , currency crisis , monetary economics , keynesian economics , psychology , microeconomics , genetics , biology , psychiatry
Crises, such as revolutions and currency attacks, rarely occur; but when they do they typically arrive in waves. The rarity of crises itself is an important contagion mechanism in a multiple-country dynamic global game model. When players are uncertain about the true model of the world, observing a rare success elsewhere can substantially change their expectations concerning the payoffs from attacking or defending the regime. Such dramatic revisions in beliefs, amplified by strategic complementarity in actions, may lead to a series of attacks in other countries. The crisis period can be long-lasting, but will eventually come to an end.postprin
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