Open AccessFree Trade Agreements and the Consolidation of Democracy
Author(s) -
Xuepeng Liu,
Emanuel Ornelas
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
american economic journal macroeconomics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 10.443
H-Index - 61
eISSN - 1945-7707
pISSN - 1945-7715
DOI - 10.1257/mac.6.2.29
Subject(s) - economic rent , economics , democracy , protectionism , international economics , incentive , free trade , regionalism (politics) , authoritarianism , consolidation (business) , democratization , international trade , economic system , development economics , market economy , political science , politics , accounting , law
We study the relationship between participation in free trade agreements (FTAs) and the sustainability of democracy. Our model shows that FTAs can critically reduce the incentive of authoritarian groups to seek power by destroying protectionist rents, thus making democracies last longer. This gives governments in unstable democracies an extra motive to form FTAs. Hence, greater democratic instability induces governments to boost their FTA commitments. In a dataset with 116 countries over 1960-2007, we find robust support for these predictions. They help to rationalize the rapid simultaneous growth of regionalism and of worldwide democratization since the late 1980s
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