How to Judge Voting Schemes | Zendy

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How to Judge Voting Schemes

Author(s) -

Amartya Sen

Publication year - 1995

Publication title -

the journal of economic perspectives

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 9.614

H-Index - 196

eISSN - 1944-7965

pISSN - 0895-3309

DOI - 10.1257/jep.9.1.91

Subject(s) - converse , voting , axiom , mathematical economics , cardinal voting systems , social choice theory , anti plurality voting , computer science , approval voting , process (computing) , disapproval voting , econometrics , economics , microeconomics , mathematics , political science , law , geometry , politics , operating system

This symposium on voting procedures presents many interesting findings and insights. This note scrutinizes them and discusses two general issues. First, the assumption that voters' preferences are menu-independent (and based on one canonical ordering of the alternatives) underestimates the importance of the process of voting (voting for x, against y). Second, evaluation can be a two-way process, including the axiomatic method (of social choice theory), going from isolated properties to voting schemes, and the converse method of first identifying attractions and perversities of particular voting schemes (as in this symposium) and then using properties for later axiomatic use.

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