Optimal Voting Rules | Zendy

Peyton Young | Zendy

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Optimal Voting Rules

Author(s) -

Peyton Young

Publication year - 1995

Publication title -

the journal of economic perspectives

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 9.614

H-Index - 196

eISSN - 1944-7965

pISSN - 0895-3309

DOI - 10.1257/jep.9.1.51

Subject(s) - condorcet method , arrow , social choice theory , voting , axiom , cardinal voting systems , bullet voting , approval voting , anti plurality voting , mathematical economics , majority rule , economics , arrow's impossibility theorem , econometrics , computer science , microeconomics , mathematics , political science , artificial intelligence , law , geometry , politics , programming language

Modern social choice theory, following Kenneth Arrow, treats voting as a method for aggregating diverse preferences and values. An earlier view, initiated by Marquis de Condorcet, is that voting is a method for aggregating information. Voters' opinions differ because they make errors of judgment; absent these errors they would all agree on the best choice. The goal is to design a voting rule that identifies the best choice with highest probability. This paper examines maximum likelihood estimation. Surprisingly, the optimal rule can also be axiomatized by variations of Arrow's axioms.

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