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Competition Policy, Rivalries, and Defense Industry Consolidation
Author(s) -
William E. Kovacic,
Dennis E. Smallwood
Publication year - 1994
Publication title -
the journal of economic perspectives
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 9.614
H-Index - 196
eISSN - 1944-7965
pISSN - 0895-3309
DOI - 10.1257/jep.8.4.91
Subject(s) - consolidation (business) , defense industry , competition (biology) , competition policy , business , mergers and acquisitions , national security , industrial organization , defence industry , economics , international trade , economic policy , political science , finance , management , law , ecology , european union , biology
Declining outlays for new weapons programs have triggered a process of consolidation that promises to shrink the U.S. defense industry drastically. Consolidation in the defense industry raises complex competition policy issues that are not amenable to conventional antitrust merger analysis. This paper presents a framework for identifying important contractor competencies, assessing rivalries in defense industry segments, and evaluating the competitive effects of mergers and other consolidation events. As applied to antitrust oversight and to Department of Defense funding, program, and acquisition strategy decisions, this framework can help preserve supply alternatives for developing state-of-the-art weapons needed to satisfy national security requirements.

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