Rationality in Extensive-Form Games | Zendy

Philip J. Reny | Zendy

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Rationality in Extensive-Form Games

Author(s) -

Philip J. Reny

Publication year - 1992

Publication title -

the journal of economic perspectives

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 9.614

H-Index - 196

eISSN - 1944-7965

pISSN - 0895-3309

DOI - 10.1257/jep.6.4.103

Subject(s) - rationality , mathematical economics , point (geometry) , context (archaeology) , game theory , computer science , epistemology , economics , mathematics , philosophy , paleontology , geometry , biology

Let us adopt the classical point of view that a theory of games is a description of "rational" behavior. Consequently, equipped with a book entitled "Theory of Games," any individual in any strategic situation need only consult the book to make a "rational" decision. One of the questions to address in this context is indeed whether or not strategies other than those provided by backward induction can ever appear in such a book. In offering an answer, we shall also explore the logical limits within which any "Theory of Games" must operate.

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