Liability for Medical Malpractice
Author(s) -
Patricia M. Danzon
Publication year - 1991
Publication title -
the journal of economic perspectives
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 9.614
H-Index - 196
eISSN - 1944-7965
pISSN - 0895-3309
DOI - 10.1257/jep.5.3.51
Subject(s) - malpractice , liability , actuarial science , odds , liability insurance , business , medical malpractice , economics , law and economics , law , insurance policy , medicine , finance , political science , logistic regression
Physicians and other medical providers are subject to a negligence rule of liability. In a simple model, with perfect information and homogeneous physicians, a negligence rule of liability with an appropriately defined due care standard should induce complete compliance: there should be no malpractice, no malpractice claims, and no demand for malpractice insurance. The malpractice experience is seriously at odds with this prediction. First, what goes wrong? Second, if the system does indeed operate imperfectly, does it yield benefits in terms of injuries deterred that outweigh the high overhead costs of operating a liability system?
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