New Directions for Modelling Strategic Behavior: Game-Theoretic Models of Communication, Coordination, and Cooperation in Economic Relationships | Zendy

Vincent P. Crawford | Zendy

Open Access

New Directions for Modelling Strategic Behavior: Game-Theoretic Models of Communication, Coordination, and Cooperation in Economic Relationships

Author(s) -

Vincent P. Crawford

Publication year - 2016

Publication title -

the journal of economic perspectives

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 9.614

H-Index - 196

eISSN - 1944-7965

pISSN - 0895-3309

DOI - 10.1257/jep.30.4.131

Subject(s) - nash equilibrium , game theory , coordination game , principal (computer security) , equilibrium selection , strategic interaction , management science , economics , mathematical economics , focus (optics) , cheap talk , computer science , microeconomics , repeated game , physics , optics , operating system

In this paper, I discuss the state of progress in applications of game theory in economics and try to identify possible future developments that are likely to yield further progress. To keep the topic manageable, I focus on a canonical economic problem that is inherently game-theoretic, that of fostering efficient coordination and cooperation in relationships, with particular attention to the role of communication. I begin with an overview of noncooperative game theory's principal model of behavior, Nash equilibrium. I next discuss the alternative “thinking” and “learning” rationales for how real-world actors might reach equilibrium decisions. I then review how Nash equilibrium has been used to model coordination, communication, and cooperation in relationships, and discuss possible developments

The content you want is available to Zendy users.

Already have an account? Click here to sign in.

Having issues? You can contact us here

Accelerating Research