Rethinking Federalism
Author(s) -
Robert P. Inman,
Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Publication year - 1997
Publication title -
the journal of economic perspectives
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 9.614
H-Index - 196
eISSN - 1944-7965
pISSN - 0895-3309
DOI - 10.1257/jep.11.4.43
Subject(s) - federalism , legislature , cooperative federalism , democracy , fiscal federalism , government (linguistics) , politics , public good , public economics , economics , political science , strengths and weaknesses , public administration , business , decentralization , market economy , law , microeconomics , linguistics , philosophy , epistemology
The appropriate federal structure of government is now a policy issue of major debate. This paper identifies three approaches and compares their strengths and weaknesses. Economic federalism recommends the use of competitive communities for the provision of congestible local goods and a strong central government for the provision of pure public goods and spillovers. Cooperative federalism recommends intercommunity agreements; democratic federalism prefers a majority-rule representative legislature. Efficiency will sometimes conflict with other constitutional objectives--political participation and the protection of rights--and compromises will often be required.
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