Tax Reform as Political Choice | Zendy

James M. Buchanan | Zendy

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Tax Reform as Political Choice

Author(s) -

James M. Buchanan

Publication year - 1987

Publication title -

the journal of economic perspectives

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 9.614

H-Index - 196

eISSN - 1944-7965

pISSN - 0895-3309

DOI - 10.1257/jep.1.1.29

Subject(s) - presumption , politics , discretion , legislation , economics , linkage (software) , public economics , value (mathematics) , public choice , tax reform , law and economics , positive economics , microeconomics , political science , law , biochemistry , chemistry , machine learning , computer science , gene

Public choice theory explains and interprets politics as the interaction among constituents and agents seeking to advance or to express their own interests. Applied to an observed political event like the 1986 tax reform legislation, any such analysis must identify the effects on separate interests and make some presumption concerning the perception of these effects. The linkage between assigning gains and losses from the 1986 tax changes and explaining these changes depends critically on the model of political choice. Political reality presumably embodies some mix of models of consensus, conflict, and agents' discretion. These three models are examined separately, with features from each retaining some explanatory value.

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