z-logo
open-access-imgOpen Access
Regulating Markups in US Health Insurance
Author(s) -
Steve Cicala,
Ethan M.J. Lieber,
Victoria Marone
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
american economic journal applied economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 12.996
H-Index - 82
eISSN - 1945-7782
pISSN - 1945-7790
DOI - 10.1257/app.20180011
Subject(s) - markup language , health insurance , incentive , actuarial science , business , profit (economics) , health care , economics , microeconomics , computer science , xml , economic growth , operating system
A health insurer's Medical Loss Ratio (MLR) is the share of premiums spent on medical claims, or the inverse markup over average claims cost. The Affordable Care Act introduced minimum MLR provisions for all health insurance sold in fully insured commercial markets, thereby capping insurer profit margins, but not levels. While intended to reduce premiums, we show this rule creates incentives to increase costs. Using variation created by the rule's introduction as a natural experiment, we find medical claims rose nearly one-for-one with distance below the regulatory threshold: 7 percent in the individual market and 2 percent in the group market. Premiums were unaffected. (JEL G22, H51, I13, I18)

The content you want is available to Zendy users.

Already have an account? Click here to sign in.
Having issues? You can contact us here
Accelerating Research

Address

John Eccles House
Robert Robinson Avenue,
Oxford Science Park, Oxford
OX4 4GP, United Kingdom