One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime | Zendy

Quoc-Anh Do | Zendy; Kieu-Trang Nguyen | Zendy; Ngoc Anh Tran | Zendy

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One Mandarin Benefits the Whole Clan: Hometown Favoritism in an Authoritarian Regime

Author(s) -

Quoc-Anh Do,

Kieu-Trang Nguyen,

Ngoc Anh Tran

Publication year - 2017

Publication title -

american economic journal applied economics

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 12.996

H-Index - 82

eISSN - 1945-7782

pISSN - 1945-7790

DOI - 10.1257/app.20130472

Subject(s) - authoritarianism , clan , politics , corporate governance , political science , power (physics) , political economy , ranking (information retrieval) , democracy , economics , law , physics , finance , quantum mechanics , machine learning , computer science

We study patronage politics in authoritarian Vietnam, using an exhaustive panel of ranking officials from 2000 to 2010 to estimate their promotions' impact on infrastructure in their hometowns of patrilineal ancestry. Native officials' promotions lead to a broad range of hometown infrastructure improvement. Hometown favoritism is pervasive across all ranks, even among officials without budget authority, except among elected legislators. Favors are narrowly targeted toward small communes that have no political power, and are strengthened with bad local governance and strong local family values. The evidence suggests a likely motive of social preferences for hometown

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