Deliberately Stochastic
Author(s) -
Simone CerreiaVioglio,
David Dillenberger,
Pietro Ortoleva,
Gil Riella
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
american economic review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 16.936
H-Index - 297
eISSN - 1944-7981
pISSN - 0002-8282
DOI - 10.1257/aer.20180688
Subject(s) - complementarity (molecular biology) , monotonic function , mathematical economics , outcome (game theory) , economics , set (abstract data type) , representation (politics) , mathematics , econometrics , mathematical optimization , computer science , mathematical analysis , genetics , politics , political science , law , biology , programming language
We study stochastic choice as the outcome of deliberate randomization. We derive a general representation of a stochastic choice function where stochasticity allows the agent to achieve from any set the maximal element according to her underlying preferences over lotteries. We show that in this model stochasticity in choice captures complementarity between elements in the set, and thus necessarily implies violations of Regularity/Monotonicity, one of the most common properties of stochastic choice. This feature separates our approach from other models, e.g., Random Utility. (JEL D80, D81)
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