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Coordination Analysis of Revenue Sharing in E-Commerce Logistics Service Supply Chain With Cooperative Distribution
Author(s) -
Zhong Yaoguang,
Guo Fangfang,
Wang Zhiqiang,
Tang Huajun
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
sage open
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.357
H-Index - 32
ISSN - 2158-2440
DOI - 10.1177/2158244019870536
Subject(s) - stackelberg competition , supply chain , business , revenue sharing , profit (economics) , service management , integrated logistics support , supply chain management , service provider , service (business) , bottleneck , e commerce , humanitarian logistics , revenue , service level , process management , industrial organization , marketing , operations management , computer science , microeconomics , economics , finance , world wide web
With the rapid development of e-commerce, logistics distribution has become the bottleneck of its development. It is urgent to study how to optimize the cooperation between e-commerce platforms and logistics service providers. Based on Stackelberg game theory, this research first studies the decision making of two-stage logistics service supply chains consisting of the e-commerce mall and the logistics service provider without cooperative distribution, in which decentralization and centralization are analyzed, respectively. Then, it is extended to the decision making of three-stage logistics service supply chains consisting of e-commerce malls, express delivery companies, and terminal distributors. The results show that the profit, sales volume, and logistics service effort of the centralized decision-making system are higher than those of the decentralized decision-making system, regardless of the two-stage or three-stage logistics service supply chain. Therefore, it is vital to formulate a reasonable profit distribution scheme based on revenue-sharing contract to achieve the cooperation among the partners of logistics service supply chain, so as to achieve a win-win situation in which all of their profits increase. Finally, a numerical example is presented to verify the results, and some issues are proposed for future research.

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