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Conceptualizing intellectual attention
Author(s) -
Fortney Mark
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
theory & psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.658
H-Index - 52
eISSN - 1461-7447
pISSN - 0959-3543
DOI - 10.1177/0959354319853632
Subject(s) - inattentional blindness , perception , psychology , criticism , cognitive psychology , meaning (existential) , intellectual disability , epistemology , political science , law , neuroscience , psychiatry , philosophy , psychotherapist
Remembering that there’s a difference between intellectual and perceptual attention can help us avoid miscommunication due to meaning different things by the same terms, which has been a particular problem during the last hundred years or so of the study of attention. I demonstrate this through analyzing in depth one such miscommunication that occurred in a philosophical criticism of the influential psychological text, Inattentional Blindness . But after making the distinction between perceptual attention and intellectual attention, and after making an effort to keep this distinction in mind, we are still faced with the problem of specifying what makes intellectual attention distinct from perceptual attention. In the second half of this article, I discuss the range of proposals about how to understand intellectual attention that are present in the literature, and the problems with them. I do this with the aim of stimulating further discussion about how best to conceptualize intellectual attention, although I do not settle that further question within this paper.

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