Open AccessCONDORCET CONSISTENCY OF APPROVAL VOTING: A COUNTER EXAMPLE IN LARGE POISSON GAMES
Author(s) -
Matías Núñez
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
hal (le centre pour la communication scientifique directe)
Language(s) - English
DOI - 10.1177/09516298093
Subject(s) - condorcet method , approval voting , consistency (knowledge bases) , poisson distribution , voting , bullet voting , anti plurality voting , mathematics , mathematical economics , econometrics , statistics , computer science , political science , discrete mathematics , law , politics
International audienceApproval Voting is analyzed in a context of large elections with strategic voters: the Myerson's Large Poisson Games. We first establish the Magnitude Equivalence Theorem which substantially reduces the complexity of comput- ing the magnitudes of the pivot outcomes. Furthermore, we show that the Condorcet Winner need not be the Winner of the election in equilibrium under Approval Voting. Indeed, a 'paradoxical' example is provided where a candidate ranked first by more than half of the voters is not the Winner of the election