Investigating the Robustness of the Illusory Truth Effect Across Individual Differences in Cognitive Ability, Need for Cognitive Closure, and Cognitive Style
Author(s) -
De keersmaecker Jonas,
Dunning David,
Pennycook Gordon,
Rand David G.,
Sanchez Carmen,
Unkelbach Christian,
Roets Arne
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
personality and social psychology bulletin
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.584
H-Index - 193
eISSN - 1552-7433
pISSN - 0146-1672
DOI - 10.1177/0146167219853844
Subject(s) - moderation , cognition , cognitive style , psychology , cognitive psychology , social psychology , closure (psychology) , style (visual arts) , need for cognition , archaeology , neuroscience , economics , market economy , history
People are more inclined to believe that information is true if they have encountered it before. Little is known about whether this illusory truth effect is influenced by individual differences in cognition. In seven studies (combined N = 2,196), using both trivia statements (Studies 1-6) and partisan news headlines (Study 7), we investigate moderation by three factors that have been shown to play a critical role in epistemic processes: cognitive ability (Studies 1, 2, 5), need for cognitive closure (Study 1), and cognitive style, that is, reliance on intuitive versus analytic thinking (Studies 1, 3-7). All studies showed a significant illusory truth effect, but there was no evidence for moderation by any of the cognitive measures across studies. These results indicate that the illusory truth effect is robust to individual differences in cognitive ability, need for cognitive closure, and cognitive style.
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