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Unpacking Robert Spaemann’s Philosophical Contribution to the Brain Death Debate
Author(s) -
Gardner Elinor
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
the linacre quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.148
H-Index - 9
eISSN - 2050-8549
pISSN - 0024-3639
DOI - 10.1177/0024363919876391
Subject(s) - explication , epistemology , philosophical methodology , philosophical analysis , philosophy , thanatology , sociology , social science
Questions of life and death are primarily philosophical questions, as philosopher Robert Spaemann argues. Spaemann argues that “brain death” is philosophically unsatisfactory as a definition of death, and as the exclusive criterion for determining death, for two main reasons: first, because it attempts to annul the basic perceptions of the ordinary person in regard to death. Second, because the cause of life and unity in a living being cannot be reduced to the brain. This essay is an explication of Spaemann’s contribution to the “brain death” question, which consists in illuminating the philosophical issues at stake.Summary: This article presents Robert Spaemann’s philosophical case that “brain death” suffices neither as a definition of death nor as the sole criterion of death.

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