The Lesser Evil? Corruption Voting and the Importance of Clean Alternatives
Author(s) -
Agerberg Mattias
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
comparative political studies
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 4.017
H-Index - 110
eISSN - 1552-3829
pISSN - 0010-4140
DOI - 10.1177/0010414019852697
Subject(s) - language change , voting , democracy , politics , economics , political economy , political science , public economics , law and economics , law , art , literature
Surveys show that citizens in all parts of the world have a strong distaste for corruption. At the same time, and contrary to the predictions of democratic theory, politicians involved in the most glaring abuse of public office often continue to receive electoral support. Using an original survey experiment conducted in Spain, this article explores a previously understudied aspect of this apparent paradox: the importance of viable and clean political alternatives. The results suggest that voters do punish political corruption when a clean alternative exists, even when the corrupt candidate is very appealing in other respects. However, when only given corrupt alternatives, respondents become much more likely to tolerate a candidate accused of corruption—even when given a convenient “no-choice” option. I discuss how these results can help us understand corruption voting and why some societies seem to be stuck in a high-corruption equilibrium.
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