The Rationality of the Process of Theory Change in Science
Author(s) -
Bisrat Tesfay
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
international journal of philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2330-7439
pISSN - 2330-7455
DOI - 10.11648/j.ijp.20200802.14
Subject(s) - epistemology , rationality , philosophy of science , normal science , scientific theory , subject (documents) , scientific method , criticism , process (computing) , philosophy , sociology , computer science , political science , law , library science , operating system
This article gives an ephemeral overview of the most influential views on the nature and process of change in science. Theory change in science is one of the most important issues in philosophy of science. Scientific theories are subject to change beyond space and time. There are various factors that lead theories change such as discomfort among the theories. In this paper, discussing how the rationality of science was related with its methods and methodologies, I tried to show that it was after Kuhn’s work the Structure of Scientific Revolutions that the debate on theory choice becomes a central issue in philosophy of science. Following this the process in theory change in science can be deductive and inductive or rational and non-rational. According to the account of Kuhn’s scientific change there are four steps in the process of scientific change; the predominant one is normal science, anomalies, crisis and finally a new phase of normal science. Then I discussed some of the philosophers who criticize Kuhn’s work Structure of Scientific Revolutions, particularly popper’s criticism on Kuhn; in this regard I also forwarded Kuhn’s response for his critics. Finally I critically compared Kuhn’s and Popper’s ideas on the evolution of science.
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