Influence of CEOs Power on Their Compensation
Author(s) -
Omamo Anne,
Peter K’Obonyo,
Florence Muind Florence Muind
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
european business and management
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2575-5811
pISSN - 2575-579X
DOI - 10.11648/j.ebm.20200606.12
Subject(s) - incentive , business , executive compensation , profitability index , shareholder , compensation (psychology) , context (archaeology) , power (physics) , bidding , accounting , labour economics , corporate governance , economics , marketing , finance , microeconomics , psychology , paleontology , physics , quantum mechanics , psychoanalysis , biology
There is growing concern that over recent decades CEOs tend to earn overwhelmingly more than the average worker. This throws the researchers to question the economic benefit of paying CEOs huge amount of money while we have discouraged workers who may become less productive and therefore lowering the firm profitability. Researchers have taken positions on both sides of the debate over whether the level of CEO’s pay is economically justified or is the result of managerial power. This study sought to establish the extent of power that CEO’s possess among Kenya firms listed at the Nairobi Securities Exchange. CEO’s power was measured in terms of structural power, ownership power, CEO tenure and Board composition. The study used secondary data. Data was collected from 60 firms listed at the NSE. Using a cross sectional design, a regression model was fitted to show the relationship between CEO’s power and CEO’s compensation. Descriptive and inferential results were obtained. The findings revealed that in the Kenyan context CEO’s power does not significantly influence CEO’s compensation. CEO’s pay is market-determined and reflects the bidding by firms for scarce executive talent. The increase in CEO’s pay is due to the rise in incentive compensation that links pay to firm performance and aligns the incentives of managers with those of shareholders.
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