Contractually-constructed Research Commons: A Critical Economic Appraisal

In the last decade there has been a growing and high pitched debate about the expansion of exclusionary and proprietary strategies (intellectual property rights and sui generis regimes, restrictive licensing etc.) for the appropriation of the value of knowledge and information resources. The main point of contention has centered on the justification for the adoption of these strategies and how actors in this setting achieve to manage the production, dissemination and use of knowledge and information (Dreyfuss, Zimmerman & First, 2001). On one hand, the optimists have highlighted the powerful synergies in the coupling of strong rights and contractual freedom, identifying in markets, patent pools and collaborative agreements the mechanisms to efficiently allocate resources to the most productive users. On the other hand, the pessimists contend that the expansion of property rights and exclusionary strategies is likely to delay or deter innovation because of an overall increase in transaction costs and the emergence of strategic behavior in the integration of complementary information resources. Further, they see collaborative private arrangements as a whammy that stifles competition and imposes negative externalities on both consumers and prospective innovators (Hope, 2008).