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The Politics of the Taliban’s Shadow Judiciary, 2003–2013
Author(s) -
Antonio Giustozzi,
Adam Baczko
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
central asian affairs
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
eISSN - 2214-2290
pISSN - 2214-2282
DOI - 10.1163/22142290-00102003
Subject(s) - coercion (linguistics) , shadow (psychology) , appeal , politics , government (linguistics) , political science , population , law , resistance (ecology) , law and economics , punishment (psychology) , sociology , psychology , social psychology , ecology , philosophy , linguistics , demography , psychotherapist , biology
The Taliban established their own judicial system in Afghanistan as both an instrument of population control and as a means to project themselves as an effective parallel government. Despite the heavy reliance on coercion, the Taliban’s method of dealing with common criminality and resolving disputes was often welcome, though the weak appeal system and the rapidity of the trials was sometimes criticized. A more structured approach to coercion, featuring rules, regulation and supervision over the military, allows less use of violence and promises increased predictability for the population, making active resistance less of a necessity. In the long run, the establishment of credible judiciary institutions reshapes the social environment and creates vested interests in favor of Taliban domination.

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