Spontaneous Mentalizing Predicts the Fundamental Attribution Error
Author(s) -
Joseph M. Moran,
Eshin Jolly,
Jason P. Mitchell
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
journal of cognitive neuroscience
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.597
H-Index - 214
eISSN - 1530-8898
pISSN - 0898-929X
DOI - 10.1162/jocn_a_00513
Subject(s) - psychology , mentalization , attribution , situational ethics , social psychology , feeling , personality , attribution bias , cognitive psychology , inference , social cognition , theory of mind , developmental psychology , cognition , neuroscience , philosophy , epistemology
When explaining the reasons for others' behavior, perceivers often overemphasize underlying dispositions and personality traits over the power of the situation, a tendency known as the fundamental attribution error. One possibility is that this bias results from the spontaneous processing of others' mental states, such as their momentary feelings or more enduring personality characteristics. Here, we use fMRI to test this hypothesis. Participants read a series of stories that described a target's ambiguous behavior in response to a specific social situation and later judged whether that act was attributable to the target's internal dispositions or to external situational factors. Neural regions consistently associated with mental state inference-especially, the medial pFC-strongly predicted whether participants later made dispositional attributions. These results suggest that the spontaneous engagement of mentalizing may underlie the biased tendency to attribute behavior to dispositional over situational forces.
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