Open AccessCREDIT, WAGES, AND BANKRUPTCY LAWS
Author(s) -
Biais Bruno,
Mariotti Thomas
Publication year - 2009
Publication title -
journal of the european economic association
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 7.792
H-Index - 93
eISSN - 1542-4774
pISSN - 1542-4766
DOI - 10.1162/jeea.2009.7.5.939
Subject(s) - economics , bankruptcy , credit rationing , creditor , subsidy , welfare , ex ante , enforcement , labour economics , monetary economics , law , debt , interest rate , market economy , finance , political science , macroeconomics
We analyze how bankruptcy laws affect the general equilibrium interactions between credit and wages. Soft laws reduce the frequency of liquidations and thus ex post inefficiencies, but they worsen credit rationing ex ante. This hinders firm creation and thus depresses labor demand. Rich agents who need few outside funds can invest even if creditor rights are weak. Hence, they favor soft laws that exclude poorer agents from the credit market and reduce the competition for labor. Such laws can generate greater utilitarian welfare than under perfect contract enforcement: By barring access to credit to some agents, soft laws lower wages, which increases the pledgeable income of richer agents and decreases the liquidation rates they must commit to. When they induce strong credit rationing, however, soft laws are Pareto‐dominated by tougher laws combined with subsidies to entrepreneurs. (JEL: D82, G33, K22)