ON THE ROBUSTNESS OF MAJORITY RULE | Zendy

Dasgupta Partha | Zendy; Maskin Eric | Zendy

AI Assistant Blog Pricing

Home ZAIA Blog

Open Access

ON THE ROBUSTNESS OF MAJORITY RULE

Author(s) -

Dasgupta Partha,

Maskin Eric

Publication year - 2008

Publication title -

journal of the european economic association

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 7.792

H-Index - 93

eISSN - 1542-4774

pISSN - 1542-4766

DOI - 10.1162/jeea.2008.6.5.949

Subject(s) - majority rule , voting , anonymity , independence of irrelevant alternatives , axiom , mathematical economics , pareto principle , robustness (evolution) , neutrality , anti plurality voting , social choice theory , cardinal voting systems , property (philosophy) , economics , preference , condorcet method , simple (philosophy) , independence (probability theory) , computer science , microeconomics , mathematics , artificial intelligence , computer security , statistics , political science , law , philosophy , operations management , chemistry , biochemistry , geometry , epistemology , politics , gene

We show that simple majority rule satisfies five standard and attractive axioms—the Pareto property, anonymity, neutrality, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and (generic) decisiveness—over a larger class of preference domains than (essentially) any other voting rule. Hence, in this sense, it is the most robust voting rule. This characterization of majority rule provides an alternative to that of May (1952). (JEL: D71)

The content you want is available to Zendy users.

Already have an account? Click here to sign in.

Having issues? You can contact us here

Accelerating Research