POLITICAL REPUTATIONS AND CAMPAIGN PROMISES | Zendy

Aragonès Enriqueta | Zendy; Postlewaite Andrew | Zendy; Palfrey Thomas | Zendy

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POLITICAL REPUTATIONS AND CAMPAIGN PROMISES

Author(s) -

Aragonès Enriqueta,

Postlewaite Andrew,

Palfrey Thomas

Publication year - 2007

Publication title -

journal of the european economic association

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 7.792

H-Index - 93

eISSN - 1542-4774

pISSN - 1542-4766

DOI - 10.1162/jeea.2007.5.4.846

Subject(s) - reputation , ideology , politics , value (mathematics) , function (biology) , economics , affect (linguistics) , microeconomics , political science , advertising , positive economics , business , psychology , computer science , law , communication , machine learning , evolutionary biology , biology

We analyze conditions under which candidates' reputations may affect voters' beliefs over what policy will be implemented by the winning candidate of an election. We develop a model of repeated elections with complete information in which candidates are purely ideological. We analyze an equilibrium in which voters' strategies involve a credible threat to punish candidates who renege on their campaign promises and in which all campaign promises are believed by voters and honored by candidates. We characterize the maximal credible campaign promises and find that the degree to which promises are credible in equilibrium is an increasing function of the value of a candidate's reputation. (JEL: D8)

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