India's Counterforce Temptations: Strategic Dilemmas, Doctrine, and Capabilities
Author(s) -
Christopher Clary,
Vipin Narang
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
international security
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.69
H-Index - 106
eISSN - 1531-4804
pISSN - 0162-2889
DOI - 10.1162/isec_a_00340
Subject(s) - doctrine , nuclear weapon , deterrence theory , nuclear strategy , political science , political economy , development economics , law , economics
Is India shifting to a nuclear counterforce strategy? Continued aggression by Pakistan against India, enabled by Islamabad's nuclear strategy and India's inability to counter it, has prompted the leadership in Delhi to explore more flexible preemptive counterforce options in an attempt to reestablish deterrence. Increasingly, Indian officials are advancing the logic of counterforce targeting, and they have begun to lay out exceptions to India's long-standing no-first-use policy to potentially allow for the preemptive use of nuclear weapons. Simultaneously, India has been acquiring the components that its military would need to launch counterforce strikes. These include a growing number of accurate and responsive nuclear delivery systems, an array of surveillance platforms, and sophisticated missile defenses. Executing a counterforce strike against Pakistan, however, would be exceptionally difficult. Moreover, Pakistan's response to the mere fear that India might be pursuing a counterforce option could generate a dangerous regional arms race and crisis instability. A cycle of escalation would have significant implications not only for South Asia, but also for the broader nuclear landscape if other regional powers were similarly seduced by the temptations of nuclear counterforce.
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