Accountability and Local Control: Response to Incentives with and without Authority over Resource Generation and Allocation
Author(s) -
Susanna Loeb,
Katharine O. Strunk
Publication year - 2006
Publication title -
education finance and policy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.413
H-Index - 25
eISSN - 1557-3079
pISSN - 1557-3060
DOI - 10.1162/edfp.2007.2.1.10
Subject(s) - accountability , operationalization , incentive , control (management) , staffing , revenue , public administration , resource allocation , economics , business , decentralization , public economics , accounting , political science , law , microeconomics , market economy , philosophy , management , epistemology
This article examines the interaction between school accountability and local control over revenue raising and resource allocation. In particular, it asks whether accountability policies are more or less effective at im- proving student outcomes in states with stronger local control. Local control is operationalized with multiple measures, including the percentage of education fund- ing from categorical grants, state supreme court rulings overturning school finance systems, local entities' tax- ing authority, and principals' self-assessments of their ability to control school resources. Using the National Center for Education Statistics' Schools and Staffing Survey and National Assessment of Educational Progress, the article finds that accountability policies are more effective when there is greater local control.
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