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Constraining Bureaucracy Beyond Judicial Review
Author(s) -
Christopher J. Walker
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
daedalus
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.34
H-Index - 55
eISSN - 1548-6192
pISSN - 0011-5266
DOI - 10.1162/daed_a_01865
Subject(s) - bureaucracy , judicial review , political science , doctrine , law , statute , agency (philosophy) , judicial independence , judicial opinion , state (computer science) , judicial activism , administrative law , law and economics , sociology , politics , social science , algorithm , computer science
The modern regulatory state–and the field of administrative law that studies it–is in need of “deconstruction.” That does not mean that it should be dismantled entirely. This essay does not embrace the reformers' fixation on courts as the bulwark against agency overreach. Rather, this essay develops the concept of bureaucracy beyond judicial review: not only agency actions that statute or judicial doctrine precludes from judicial review, but also agency actions that are technically subject to judicial review yet effectively insulated from it. Appreciating the phenomenon of bureaucracy beyond judicial review should encourage us to rethink theories and doctrines in administrative law. If judicial review provides no safeguard against potential abuses of power in most regulatory activities, we must turn to other mechanisms. All three branches of the federal government must play their roles, as should civil society and the agencies themselves.

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