Building Security Forces & Stabilizing Nations: The Problem of Agency
Author(s) -
Stephen Biddle
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
daedalus
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.34
H-Index - 55
eISSN - 1548-6192
pISSN - 0011-5266
DOI - 10.1162/daed_a_00464
Subject(s) - agency (philosophy) , footprint , use of force , political science , limit (mathematics) , business , law , sociology , geography , international law , mathematical analysis , social science , mathematics , archaeology
After fifteen years of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, many now see “small-footprint” security force assistance (SFA)–training, advising, and equipping allied militaries–as an alternative to large U.S. ground-force commitments to stabilize weak states. SFA, however, confronts challenges of interest misalignment between the United States and its typical partners. The resulting agency losses often limit SFA's real ability to improve partners' military effectiveness. For SFA, small footprints usually mean small payoffs.
Accelerating Research
Robert Robinson Avenue,
Oxford Science Park, Oxford
OX4 4GP, United Kingdom
Address
John Eccles HouseRobert Robinson Avenue,
Oxford Science Park, Oxford
OX4 4GP, United Kingdom