Zoning: deliberative democracy at zero prices

of political theory turns on setting the right interaction of market and political institutions.1 Markets rest upon the twin institutions of private property and freedom of contract. The former allows all individuals the exclusive possession, use, and disposition of particular resources, such as land or chattels; the latter structures the transfer of human and tangible resources by hire, sale, lease, or partnership. Property rights both separate neighbors and allow individuals to plan over time. Contract permits them to coordinate their activities for mutual gain. It is this one-two punch that facilitates the economic growth that satis1⁄2es human wants. If that were all there was to it, then political theory would be easy because government would be irrelevant. Market systems, however, do not rest on thin air. They depend critically upon the use of state monopoly power, 1⁄2rst to protect the holders of property from depredations of strangers, and next to enforce the contracts that facilitate the transfer and recombination of human and physical assets. Try as one might, it is hard–make that impossible–to think of any just and reliable system for supplying that infrastructure that does not rely upon the sound operation of democratic politics, with its own distinctive deliberative and voting procedures. And that is where the dif1⁄2culties begin. The simmering tension between market and political institutions arises in a multitude of contexts. But it becomes perhaps most vivid in connection with the steamy local controversies over the mundane matters of the ownership and use of land: what should be done if some political majority votes to take the home or business of one person for some