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Do Factory Managers Know What Workers Want? Manager–Worker Information Asymmetries and Pareto Optimal Human Resource Management Policies
Author(s) -
Paris Adler,
Drusilla K. Brown,
Rajeev Dehejia,
George Domat,
Raymond Robertson
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
asian development review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.487
H-Index - 23
eISSN - 1996-7241
pISSN - 0116-1105
DOI - 10.1162/adev_a_00081
Subject(s) - factory (object oriented programming) , business , working time , work (physics) , human resource management , human resources , compensation (psychology) , perception , pareto principle , survey data collection , labour economics , operations management , economics , computer science , psychology , management , engineering , mechanical engineering , statistics , mathematics , neuroscience , psychoanalysis , programming language
This paper evaluates the conjecture that factory managers may not be offering a cost-minimizing configuration of compensation and workplace amenities by using manager and worker survey data from Better Work Vietnam. Working conditions are found to have a significant positive impact on global life assessments and reduce measures of depression and traumatic stress. We find significant deviations in manager perceptions of working conditions from those of workers. These deviations significantly impact a worker's perception of well-being and indicators of mental health. Such deviations may lead the factory manager to underprovide certain workplace amenities relative to the cost-minimizing configuration, which may in part explain the persistence of relatively poor working conditions in developing economies.

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