Ecosystem Platform for the Defence and Security Sector of Ukraine

While success in current and future conflicts will increasingly be predicated by optimisation of high-tech solutions rather than military capabilities based on mass, the application of modern business approaches is of key importance for reforms aiming to adapt security and defence to the new realities. This article presents detailed analysis of ways to adapt the security and defence sector of Ukraine to Euro-Atlantic standards, taking into account Ukraine’s trajectory and growing interaction with the international security systems and the specific context shaped by the external aggression against Ukraine. Based on the analysis of existing legislation and review of theoretical sources, the author concludes that the present archaic, post-Soviet type security and defence sector of Ukraine is not adequate to the future complex challenges. Further, he applies the ecosystem approach to elaborate recommendations for the development of a modern model of national security and defence organisation based on functional integration of the capabilities of all main security and defence actors, emphasising the strategic importance of the integration of Ukraine’s security and defence sector into European and Euro-Atlantic security systems. A R T I C L E I N F O : RECEIVED: 26 MAR 2020 REVISED: 06 APR 2020 ONLINE: 14 APR 2020 K E Y W O R D S : security and defence sector, defence ecosystem, complex systems, hybrid war, capabilities, clusters, ecosystem approach, comprehensive approach, block chain Creative Commons BY-NC 4.0 Polischuk O., ISIJ 45 (2020): 7-19 8 Problem Formulation The development of effective security and defence arrangements are widely studied by Ukrainian and foreign experts. For example, authors of the scientific study from the National Security Academy “The Ukrainian security and defence sector: theory, strategy, practice” have identified optimal models for the national security and defence arrangements. However, their study does not touch upon the development of effective interrelationships and potential synergies between the constituent components of the system. The first step towards strategic changes in the sphere of national security, proposed by Volodymyr Gorbulin and Anatoliy Kachyns’kyj, is the “definition of the individual contribution to national security of each component of the national security system of the state.” The process of creation of the Security and Defence Sector (SDS) of Ukraine as a holistic system was launched back in 2007 following the requirements of the National Security Strategy ; however, it was not completed due to the lack of political will and a clear vision on the division of responsibilities between the systems’ components and on the integral basis for their interaction. These deficiencies were highlighted in the 2015 version of the National Security Strategy. The new Strategy stressed that the SDS of Ukraine is not shaped as a holistic and unified entity, guided from a single centre; that there is an institutional weakness; lack of professionalism; structural imbalance of security and defence sector components; lack of resources and inefficient use of resources in the security and defence sector. As a result of such inadequacies, the SDS of Ukraine does not provide timely and effective response to a wide spectrum of threats, generated primarily by the aggressive policy of Russia, as clearly drawn from the results of defence reviews in Ukraine of 2014 and 2019. In this respect, the main instrument of pressure on Ukraine is the combination of ‘hard power’ in the form of open armed aggression with ‘soft power’ influence focused mainly on the economic, media, and social spheres of the Ukrainian society. Here, the hybrid character of the modern war prevails over the physical one. Attempts of the SDS components to create institutionally self-sufficient systems of reaction to the whole spectrum of threats through development of respective capabilities leads to duplication, complication of the management system and inefficient use of resources. The SDS at present has a limited capacity to respond coherently to modern threats as a result of ineffective interagency cooperation. So far, there is no extensive research on the construction of SDS as a complex, cluster-type integrated system based on open information platforms. The implementation of such approach would allow concentration and multiplication of the necessary capabilities to perform effectively in a range of scenarios. While the main capabilities will be provided by state agencies, the concept of outsourcing certain capabilities can also be implemented. Ecosystem Platform for the Defence and Security Sector of Ukraine 9 The purpose of this study is to prepare recommendations for introducing the most effective model of national security and defence in Ukraine and thus enhance its capacity to fulfil its fundamental constitutional function – to guarantee the security for the citizens and the state. Therefore, the first section of this article is devoted to analysis of the international best practices and current scientific achievements and reveals the major trends in the development of national defence systems. The analysis of Ukraine’s existing national security system, provided in the second part of the study, detects the most problematic areas in its ability to respond to actual and potential threats. The third section focuses on the transformation of Ukraine’s defence sector through implementation of best practices, changes in the strategic culture inside of system, and the adaptation of national legislation to NATO and EU policies. The conclusions and recommendations provided in the final section of the study should help decision makers to build a modern defence model of Ukraine. Defence Ecosystems in Theory and Practice Back in 1935, the British botanist and pioneer in the ecology science Arthur Tansley introduced the term “ecosystem.” It was commonly used to refer to natural living organisms that had adapted themselves to coexistence in one environment – the biotope, forming a coherent system. Each individual in such a system has its own role and own relations with other entities. The system is selfregulated by natural rules. In the early 1960s, the Canadian philosopher Marshall McLuhan formulated the term “media ecology” and developed the media ecology theory – the study of impact of media, technology, and communication on the human environments. This theory is still valid in the context of modern hybrid wars. The term “urban ecosystems” was introduced in the 1980s. Today, it is widely used, e.g. by the Australian national science agency (Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation) which studies cities as integrated social-ecological systems with the aim to develop sustainable approaches for urban design that reduce negative impact on surrounding environments. Uncertainty and diversity of the modern world, the complexity of hybrid threats gave birth to a new approach for defence in the first decade of the XXI century. The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) introduced the notion of a defence industrial ecosystem as an analytical tool for discussion on the nature of the roles of defence manufacturing and service industries in a complex world. In 2017, the British researcher Richard Fisher from Cranfield University prepared a brief guide on the networks and relationships of the entire defence ecosystem and how they operate as part of the £ 30 billion turnover across the defence and security industries. The hybrid nature of modern security threats requires the involvement of organisations which have been never considered as part of defence systems, but could play a crucial role in achieving victory. In his research paper Fisher states: “Considering any industry as an ecosystem begins Polischuk O., ISIJ 45 (2020): 7-19 10 to imply how simple changes in one area can permeate throughout and there is often reliance upon an area that may not be known about.” For example, the US intelligence ecosystem is built on an open communication platform in the framework of the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) based at Maryland University. This intelligence ecosystem consists of 16 national agencies and 1271 other state bodies and 1931 commercial companies. Experts of The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies consider defence as a social technology which consist of four-tiered classification, including Netherlands Defence and Security Ecosystem of the highest level. Canada’s national innovation ecosystem consists of public sector institutions, private sector businesses, and academic organizations that offer business resources and support services to Canadian companies and Armed Forces in order to meet the requirements to Canadian defence through effective collaboration. The need for more effective interagency cooperation in counter-terrorism, with a particular focus on intelligence sharing, was highlighted in the research of Iztok Prezelj and Joe Aire. Cybersecurity is probably one of the most complex areas requiring a broad spectrum of competencies, human, technological and financial resources united in a collaborative network for effective response to the growing threats. George Sharkov studied cyber resilience models and elaborated on multi-stakeholder engagement and partnership for the implementation of a national cyber resilience collaborative framework. To be effective and sustainable, such collaboration is based on governance mechanisms meeting a variety of requirements. In a recent study on organisational collaboration in the field of cybersecurity, Todor Tagarev addressed comprehensively the governance requirements to networked organisations. The holistic view allows to determine some of the basic principles for building up the defence ecosystems: engaging multiple stakeholders and customers, unity of effort, collaborative network, sharing innovation, collective management of risks, c