Four-Way Evolutionary Game Analysis of Government Project Bidding Collusion in a State of Limited Rationality Based on Prospect Theory | Zendy

Chongsen Ma | Zendy; Chen Yun | Zendy; Sirui Nie | Zendy

Open Access

Four-Way Evolutionary Game Analysis of Government Project Bidding Collusion in a State of Limited Rationality Based on Prospect Theory

Author(s) -

Chongsen Ma,

Chen Yun,

Sirui Nie

Publication year - 2022

Publication title -

computational intelligence and neuroscience

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 0.605

H-Index - 52

eISSN - 1687-5273

pISSN - 1687-5265

DOI - 10.1155/2022/6092802

Subject(s) - collusion , bidding , microeconomics , evolutionary game theory , evolutionarily stable strategy , government (linguistics) , competition (biology) , game theory , rationality , nash equilibrium , replicator equation , repeated game , industrial organization , economics , business , ecology , population , linguistics , philosophy , demography , sociology , political science , law , biology

Controlling collusion in government bidding is a prerequisite for ensuring social justice and the smooth operation of projects. Based on the prospect theory, this article establishes a four-party evolutionary game model for tenderers, enterprises with higher willingness to collude, enterprises with lower willingness to collude, and supervising enterprises. The study uses replication dynamics to analyze the stability of strategy selection after the evolutionary game. The results show that higher project base returns increase the probability of collusion, while lower market competition, higher risk aversion, and stronger collusive regulation all reduce the probability of collusion. When regulators adopt a strong regulatory strategy, the remaining project participants tend to choose a noncollusive strategy.

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