Research on the Behavior Evolution of Interest Groups in Book Reverse Logistics

With the gradual expansion of the book logistics market and the year-on-year increase in book publications, the incidence of book reverse logistics continues to increase, and the problem of book companies’ inventory backlog has become increasingly prominent. To effectively alleviate the current backlog of book returns and exchanges, this paper constructs a two-party game model of “book publisher-book retailer,” analyzes the evolution process of book publishers and book retailers’ participation strategies and the influence of parameter changes on stable strategies through theoretical analysis and numerical simulation, and draws the following conclusions. (1) Whether book publishers and book retailers choose to participate in the reverse logistics optimization of book returns and exchanges is closely related to their benefits and costs, and it also depends on whether the other party participates in the reverse logistics optimization of books. (2) When the cost of participating in book reverse logistics reaches a certain condition, the probability of both parties participating in the optimization is the greatest.