An Evolutionary Game Analysis on Public Information Communication between the Government and the Public in China
Author(s) -
Hongsen Luo,
Ying Gao,
F.G. Shi
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
complexity
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.447
H-Index - 61
eISSN - 1099-0526
pISSN - 1076-2787
DOI - 10.1155/2021/8956704
Subject(s) - government (linguistics) , china , perspective (graphical) , resource (disambiguation) , evolutionary game theory , path (computing) , game theory , evolutionarily stable strategy , computer science , public relations , business , knowledge management , microeconomics , economics , artificial intelligence , political science , computer network , philosophy , linguistics , programming language , law
Public information is a social resource that connects all aspects of social life, regulates social activities and public behaviors, and plays a very important role in influencing public trust. Based on the perspective of communication, we divide the government into two ways to release public information, that is, mass communication and personalized recommendation. Moreover, the public can choose to acquire or not acquire a strategy. Then, this study conducts an evolutionary game between the government and the public to analyze the influence of public information on the public in China. Our objective is to find how the evolutionary path changes between the two players when strategies are changing. Then, a simulation analysis is presented in six scenarios to illustrate the results. The results show that the two players can converge to different stable statuses under different situations.
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