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Incentive Contract Design considering Fairness Preferences and Carbon Emission Reduction Multiobjective Tasks
Author(s) -
Zhipeng Li,
Shuzhen Zhu,
Xinyu Cao
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
mathematical problems in engineering
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.262
H-Index - 62
eISSN - 1026-7077
pISSN - 1024-123X
DOI - 10.1155/2021/6541682
Subject(s) - incentive , preference , government (linguistics) , reduction (mathematics) , microeconomics , order (exchange) , environmental economics , business , public economics , economics , finance , mathematics , linguistics , philosophy , geometry
Considering the multitargets of corporate carbon emission reduction and the fairness preference psychology of the company, a government incentive model for corporate carbon emission reduction was constructed. The impact of corporate fairness preferences on government carbon emission reduction incentive strategies is studied. In addition, numerical simulation is used to analyze the impact of changes in correlation coefficients, fairness preference coefficients, and discount rates on the optimal enterprise effort coefficient and the government optimal incentive coefficient. Research shows that the degree of fairness preference of a company has a direct impact on the degree of corporate effort, while the discount rate will only have an impact on the company’s long-term effort. In order to improve corporate carbon emission reduction efforts, the government must not only consider the impact of fairness preference on corporate efforts but also flexibly adjust the incentive coefficient of long-term and short-term tasks based on the discount rate.

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