Impact of Patent Infringement Compensation Rules on Patent Quality Problems | Zendy

Liang Dong | Zendy; Helin Pan | Zendy

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Impact of Patent Infringement Compensation Rules on Patent Quality Problems

Author(s) -

Liang Dong,

Helin Pan

Publication year - 2021

Publication title -

complexity

Language(s) - English

Resource type - Journals

SCImago Journal Rank - 0.447

H-Index - 61

eISSN - 1099-0526

pISSN - 1076-2787

DOI - 10.1155/2021/5554310

Subject(s) - patent infringement , duopoly , compensation (psychology) , quality (philosophy) , business , intellectual property , patent troll , investment (military) , patent law , industrial organization , law and economics , economics , law , microeconomics , political science , cournot competition , psychology , philosophy , epistemology , politics , psychoanalysis

Compensation rules for patent infringement greatly affect patent quality, which is closely related to investments. In this study, A duopoly game model was developed to analyze innovative factories’ R&D investment and patent licensing behavior, as well as the strategic choices of potential infringers under different compensation rules for patent infringement. Furthermore, a comparative analysis was conducted to analyze the patent quality under different scenarios, ultimately finalizing an optimal sequence rule for patent infringement compensation. The results show that patent quality is influenced by the invention height of patent and R&D efficiency, while the amount of patent infringement compensation has a great effect on potential infringement behavior. Patent quality can be effectively improved if the court adopts a proper sequence rule for patent infringement compensation according to the market circumstances.

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